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ence is much more satisfactory from a scientific point of view in approaching the problems of our social life.

Finally, it is regrettable that M. Novicow has seen fit to mix up with his "exchange" philosophy of society a hedonistic psychology and ethics. He says (p. 11): "All exchanges go back in the last analysis to exchange of pleasures (*jouissances*). Now, pleasure is the condition even of life. Life is, therefore, pleasure and pleasure comes from exchange, and, therefore, life comes from exchange." This shows very well the radical defect in M. Novicow's social philosophy. It is altogether too simple. Had he made human nature more complex than is indicated by such a simple hedonistic psychology, he would also have seen that human social life is much more complex and cannot be wholly explained in terms of the mutuality of services, especially not if by services we mean subjective appreciations of utility.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

VOM GEISTIGEN LEBEN UND SCHAFFEN. Von Carl Becker. Berlin: Hugo Steinitz, 1912. Pp. 164.

The purpose of this little book is to describe all the factors, in all their forms, which make the life of the modern person what it is. The author first gives a psychological analysis of the individual consciousness, laying great stress upon unconscious elements and the involuntary character of much of our experience. He has contrived to give a short sketch of his views without being too abstract, but we cannot take it as scientific psychology; it is rather a groundwork for the more suggestive part of the book. Accordingly, he turns to the development of the moral concepts, resulting from the working of the spiritual factors already discussed in a society. He defends our 'freedom,' which resides in the judgment of the understanding. Finally, he discusses our modern points of view, such as the common *Weltanschauung* of science, and analyzes the beautiful and sublime.

There are many references to the histories of various nations, to the most prominent intellectual developments, and to art and genius: combined with the easy character of the essay, this should make it interesting and suggestive to the ordinary reader.

But the book makes no new contribution to thought, and does not at all seek to meet the objections to its special doctrines which the writer must have anticipated. It is popular, rather than scientific.

R. SMITH.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

FORMAL LOGIC: A Scientific and Social Problem. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xviii, 423.

In this book Dr. Schiller paves the way for the task which was foreshadowed in "Humanism,"—the reform and reconstruction of Logic. The book is entirely polemical and destructive, being "an attempt to expound the traditional doctrine strictly, in its dependence on its fundamental assumption, *viz.*, that it is possible to study the *formal truth* of thought irrespective of its truth in point of fact, and to show that this fundamental abstraction everywhere leads to failure, failure both to account for the procedure of human thinking and failure to attain even formal consistency." The result is somewhat disappointing. In the first place, as Dr. Schiller himself hints in the preface, there is little in his criticisms that is wholly new. The formal logic which he is attacking has been long dead, and it is doubtful if there is a single teacher of logic in Great Britain who would be found to defend the traditional views in their entirety. The fact is that it will probably be difficult for anyone unfamiliar with the atmosphere of Oxford to appreciate the book fully. In Oxford, Aristotle is still regarded with a superstitious reverence, and each topic is approached with the presupposition that his view will be found to be the soundest. Moreover, there is an unfortunate tradition in Oxford by which the student of philosophy is expected to pass an examination in "Formal Logic" before he begins to study logic proper; the result is that the lecturer has to do his best to make out a case for the formal doctrines, with the uneasy feeling that the less able of his pupils will later on become hopelessly confused, while the abler will have to unlearn a great deal that he has taught them. The difficulty is felt much less by teachers in other universities, who are able to treat the subject as a single whole. Even they, however, will find much to sympathize with in many of Dr.